graph. The cuts of G are the minimal dependent sets of a matroid T ? (G) on the edge set E. A matroid T is cographic if there exists some graph G such that T is isomorphic to the cut matroid T ? (G) . Every cographic matroid is representable over any eld 18]. Therefore if an access structure A has a cographic appropriate matroid, then A is universally ideal. Unlike graphic matroids, we do not know of a simple construction of universally ideal secret sharing schemes for cographic matroids.
To be more precise, let G = (V; E) where V = f0;1;:::;ng, E V V , and e 0 = (0; 1) 2 E is a special edge which corresponds to the dealer. Let A ? (G) = cl(fC n fe 0 g : C E is a minimal cut that contains e 0 g) Then A ? (G) is universally ideal. We again demonstrate this example on the graph G 0 shown in Fig. 3 . The cuts of G 0 are fe 0 ; e 1 ; e 3 g;fe 0 ; e 2 g ; fe 0 ; e 3 ; e 4 g;fe 1 ; e 2 ; e 3 g;fe 1 ; e 4 g;fe 2 ; e 3 ; e 4 g; and these are the minimal dependent sets of the matroid T ? (G 0 ). and these sets are the minimal dependent sets of T (G 0 ). The access structure A (G 0 ) is the closure of ffe 2 ; e 3 g;fe 1 ; e 2 ; e 4 gg. The dealer is the edge e 0 . The shares of the parties e 2 and e 3 are r 1 ? r 2 and r 1 + s ? r 2 , respectively, and these parties can reconstruct the secrets by subtracting their shares. Benaloh and Leicher raise in their paper 1] is that for most access structures their scheme is not e cient: if there are n parties in the access structure and the domain of secrets is S, then the domain of shares is of cardinality jSj (2 n ) . The question is if there are more e cient schemes, or are most access structures \not e cient" and require large shares. Attempts to prove such lower bounds can be found in 7, 4, 11]. The best lower bound that was proved is jSj 2? for any constant > 0 4] .
Let us focus on one approach to prove such lower bounds, and show that it fails. The secret sharing scheme of 1] uses a monotone formula, that describes the access structure, to build a secret sharing scheme. If the formula is of length L and the domain of secrets is S, then the domain of shares is of cardinality jSj O(L) . Therefore every lower bound on the cardinality of the shares in secret sharing schemes implies a lower bound on the length of a formula that describes the access structure. Since there are known exponential lower bounds on the length of monotone formulas for some functions, one would hope that they would imply lower bounds on the size of the domain of shares. We show that this approach is wrong by describing an access structure with a super-polynomial gap between the cardinality of the domain of shares (in an e cient scheme) and the length of every formula that describes it.
Let C be the clique with`nodes. We consider the access structure CON whose appropriate matroid is the cycle matroid of C (using our notation CON = A (C)). This access structure has n = `2 ? 1 parties, which are all the edges except (0; 1) which is the dealer. The reconstructing sets of CON are all the undirected graphs such that adding the edge (0; 1) to the graph closes a cycle. In other words, the access structure CON is the collection of all the graphs that contains a path from node 0 to node 1. Hence, the formula that describes CON is the 0?1?connectivity formula. Krachmer and Wigderson 12] prove that every monotone formula for the function 0 ? 1?connectivity is of length n (log n) . On the other hand, CON is universally ideal. Example 4.5: Let G = (V; E) be an undirected graph. A cut in G is a collection of edges, such that deleting them from G increases the number of connected components in the remaining
We denote by A 0 = A (i; A 1 ) the access structure with n+`?1 parties f1;:::;i ? 1; i + 1; : : :; n; n + That is, the sets that can reconstruct the secret in the new access structure are:
The super-sets of sets from A that do not contain party i. The sets from A that do contain party i, in which party i is replaced with the sets of A 1 . Let A be a non-degenerate access structure, let i be a party in A , and let A 1 be an access structure. We will show that if A and A 1 are universally ideal then A 0 = A (i; A 1 ) is also universally ideal, by describing (for every m) an m?ideal secret sharing scheme for A 0 . Given a secret s use an m?ideal scheme to generate shares for the parties in A . Let s i be the random variable that denotes the share of party i in the scheme for A . Now use an m?ideal scheme for A 1 with secret s i to generate shares for the parties in A 1 .
It is easy to see that the 1 out of 2 threshold access structure is universally ideal (give the secret to each party). The 2 out of 2 threshold access structure is also universally ideal (give the rst party a random input r, and to the second party deal s + r mod m). Using these two access structures as building blocks, and using the above construction recursively, we get a class of universally ideal access structures. The resulting class of access structures is a special case of access structures whose appropriate matroids are graphic, a class which we discuss next.
Example 4.4: Let G = (V; E) be an undirected graph. The cycles of G (as de ned in graph theory) are the minimal dependent sets of a matroid T (G) on the edge set E. In other words, the sets of points of the matroid T (G) is the set of edges of G, and B E is an independent set of T (G) if B does not contain cycles, i.e. B is a forest in G. A matroid T is graphic if there exists some graph G such that T is isomorphic to the cycle matroid T (G). Every graphic matroid is representable over any eld 18]. Therefore if an access structure A has a graphic appropriate matroid, then A is universally ideal. To be more precise, let G = (V; E) where V = f0;1;:::;ng, E V V , and let e 0 = (0; 1) 2 E be a special edge which corresponds to the dealer. Let A (G) = cl(fC n fe 0 g : C E is a minimal cycle that contains e 0 g) Then A (G) is universally ideal. The scheme for graphic matroids is actually quite simple. Let m be the cardinality of the domain of secrets. Let r =< r 1 ; r 2 ; : : : ; r jV j?1 > be the random input For every simple path which starts at node 1, and ends at node 0, it is possible to assign 1 weights to the shares along the path, such that the weighted sum is equal to the secret s.
We demonstrate this construction on a speci c graph G 0 , shown in Fig. 3 . The cycles in the graph are: fe 0 ; e 2 ; e 3 g;fe 0 ; e 1 ; e 2 ; e 4 g ; fe 1 ; e 3 ; e 4 g; Example 4.2: Consider the following access structure F (see Fig. 1 ). The set of parties is f1;2;3;4;5;6g. The access structure is the closure of the set F m = ff1;4g ; f2;5g ; f3;6g ; f1;2;6g ; f1;3;5g ; f2;3;4g ; f4;5;6gg:
The appropriate matroid of this access structure is the Fano matroid 18], which is representable only over elds of characteristic 2. Hence F is 2?ideal, and is not 3?ideal. The 2?ideal secret sharing scheme for F uses two random bits r 0 ; r 1 which are chosen independently with uniform distribution. The scheme is described in Fig. 2 . This access structure demonstrates that being 2?ideal does not su ce to guarantee that an access scheme is universally ideal. An ideal scheme for F with secret s and random independent inputs r 0 ; r 1 . The access structure F 0 = cl(F m f3;4;5g) has a appropriate matroid that is representable over GF(3) but not over GF (2) 18]. Actually, the 3?ideal secret sharing scheme for F 0 is the same as the binary scheme for F, except here r 0 ; r 1 are chosen uniformly and independently from f0;1;2g. Notice that the parties f3;4;5g can reconstruct 2s over the two elds, which is useless over GF (2) , but enables to reconstruct the secret over GF (3) . This access structure demonstrates again that being 3?ideal does not su ce to guarantee that an access scheme is universally ideal. Example 4.3: Here we give a method for combining two ideal access structures for n and`parties into a new ideal access structure for n+`?1 parties. Let A be a non-degenerate access structure with parties f1;:::;ng, and let A 1 be an access structure with parties fn + 1; : : : ; n +`g. Corollary 3.15: If an access structure A is binary-ideal and ternary-ideal then for every q such that q is a prime power, A is q?ideal. Proof: If an access structure A is binary-ideal and ternary-ideal, then by corollaries 3.11 and 3.13 the access structure A has an appropriate matroid T that is representable over GF (2) and it has an appropriate matroid that is representable over GF (3) This last corollary is a restatement of Theorem 3.1, so it completes the arguments in the proof of our main result.
Examples and Concluding Remarks
In this section we formulate several known constructions from matroid theory as ideal access structures. Our rst two examples show that the condition of Theorem 3.1 cannot be relaxed: Being either just 2?ideal or just 3?ideal is not su cient for being universally ideal. Then, we demonstrate how graphic and cographic matroids give rise to interesting classes of universally ideal access schemes. Example 4.1: (the 2 out of 3 threshold access structure) We recall that the 2 out of 3 threshold access structure is the access structure with 3 parties in which every two parties together can reconstruct the secret, and every party by itself does not know anything about the secret. Karnin, Greene, and Hellman 10] proved that this access structure is not 2?ideal. This access structure has an appropriate matroid, U, in which V = f0;1;2;3g and I = fB : jBj 2g. It is easy to check that the matroid U is not representable over GF(2) (which, by corollary 3.11, gives an alternative proof that the access structure is not 2-ideal). But the matroid U is representable over GF(3), therefore the access structure is 3-ideal.
Here is corresponding 3?ideal scheme: Let s 2 f0;1;2g be the secret. The dealer chooses at random a number r 2 f0;1;2g. The share of party 1 is r, the share of party 2 is r + s, and the share of party 3 is r + 2s.
This access structure demonstrates that being 3?ideal does not su ce to guarantee that an access scheme is universally ideal. An additional example of this type is the following.
We rst show that no term in the polynomial f contains a variable of degree 2. Suppose, without loss of generality, that x 2 1 appears in some monomial. The polynomial f will have the form:
x 2 1 p 1 (x 2 ; : : : ; x n ) + x 1 p 2 (x 2 ; : : :; x n ) + p 3 (x 2 ; : : : ; x n ) where the polynomial p 1 is not identically zero, and p 2 ; p 3 are arbitrary polynomials. Hence there exists a substitution to the variables x 2 ; : : :; x n such that the value of p 1 after the substitution is non-zero. This substitution to f yields a polynomial in x 1 , of the form ax 2 1 + bx 1 + c, where a, the coe cient of x 1 , is non{zero. By the observation mentioned above, the resulting function of x 1 should also be component sensitive namely a permutation. It is not hard to check that any degree 2 polynomial over GF (3) is not a permutation. (Every polynomial of the form a x 1 + b where a 6 = 0 is a permutation. There are 6 such polynomials and there are 6 permutations over GF(3), therefore every degree 2 polynomial cannot be a permutation.) Thus f contains no variable of degree 2, so all its monomials are multi-linear.
Suppose f has a monomial with two or more variables. Take a minimum length monomial containing two variables, and assume that these variables are x 1 and x 2 . We set all variables in this minimum length monomial (except x 1 and x 2 ) to 1, and all remaining variables to 0. This leaves us with a function of x 1 and x 2 of the form ax 1 x 2 + bx 1 + cx 2 + d, where a 6 = 0. This two argument function should also be component sensitive. But rewriting it as x 1 (ax 2 + b) + cx 2 + d, and setting x 2 = ?b=a, we get a function of x 1 which does not depend on x 1 , and in particular is not component sensitive { a contradiction.
Therefore f contains no degree 2 variables and no monomials with two or more variables, and so is linear, of the form + P t i=1 i x i . All i must be non-zero, for otherwise f would not depend on the corresponding variable.
We remark that GF (3) is the largest eld where every component sensitive function is linear. Already for GF(4), there are 4! = 24 component sensitive functions of one variable (permutations), but only 3 4 = 12 non-constant linear functions. Now using the same arguments as in the proof of Corollary 3.11 (for the binary case), we conclude with the following characterization of ternary-ideal access structures. Corollary 3.13: An access structure A is ternary-ideal if and only if there is a matroid which is representable over GF (3) and is appropriate for A .
Conclusion of the Proof
We saw that representability over GF(2) determines if an access structure is binary-ideal, and representability over GF(3) determines if an access structure is ternary-ideal. Therefore, if an access structure is both binary-ideal and ternary-ideal, then it has an appropriate matroid that is representable over GF(2) and over GF (3) . The next proposition is due to Tutte 17] and can be found in Truemper 16] Theorem 9.2.9. The proposition states strong implications of the representability over the two nite elds. It will be used to complete the proof of our main theorem. Proposition 3.14: 17] A matroid T is representable over GF(2) and over GF(3) if and only if T is representable over any eld.
Using this proposition we get:
Binary and Ternary Domains of Secrets
In this subsection we show that the only component sensitive functions for the binary and for the ternary domains are linear. This is used to exactly characterize binary-ideal and ternary ideal access structures. We start with the binary case. Proof: Stated di erently, this lemma claims that XOR and not-XOR are the only component sensitive functions over GF (2) . Suppose, without loss of generality, that f(0; : : : ; 0) = 0. In this case we show that f(x 1 ; : : :; x t ) = P t i=1 x i = XOR(x 1 ; : : :; x t ). Given an element < x 1 ; : : : ; x t > 2 GF(q) t of Hamming weight k, set up a sequence of elements in GF(2) t which starts at < 0; 0; : : : ; 0 >, ends at < x 1 ; : : : ; x t >, has length k + 1, and successive elements in this sequence are at Hamming distance 1. Since f is component sensitive and its range is binary, we get that for the`?th element in the sequence (`= 0; 1; : : : ; k) f attains the value`mod 2. In particular, for the k?th element, f(x 1 ; : : : ; x t ) = k mod 2 = XOR(x 1 ; : : :; x t ).
We use Lemma 3.10 to give an exact characterization of binary-ideal access structures.
Corollary 3.11: An access structure A is binary-ideal if and only if there is a matroid which is representable over GF (2) and is appropriate for A . Proof: Let be a binary-ideal secret sharing scheme which realizes the access structure A . By lemma 3.9 the reconstruction function of every dependent set is component sensitive.
Therefore by lemma 3.10 every reconstruction function is linear over GF(2), so by de nition 3.6, is a linear scheme. By lemma 3.7, we conclude that if A is binary-ideal then A has an appropriate matroid which is representable over GF (2) . The other direction is implied by the su cient condition of Brickell and Davenport 6] (theorem 2.8).
The next lemma parallels Lemma 3.10, this time for the ternary case. For any nite eld GF(q), any function which maps GF(q) t into GF(q) can be expressed as a multi-variable polynomial over the eld, in which every monomial of f contains variables whose powers do not exceed q ? 1 (since x q x for every x in GF(q)). In our case q = 3 so the powers do not exceed 2.
such that f(s 1 Therefore i is not independent of Bnfjg. By Theorem 3.5, this implies that i depends on Bnfjg, contradicting the fact that B was a minimal set such that i depends upon.
mapping We conclude that these two mappings 1 and 2 have the property that B V is dependent in T if and only if 2 1 (B) is linearly dependent in GF(q) t . Thus = 2 1 is a dependence preserving mapping, and by de nition the appropriate matroid T is representable over GF(q).
Sensitive Functions
By de nition 3.3 a party i depends on a subset B if there exists a reconstruction function of the share of party i from the shares of the parties in B. In this subsection we study the reconstruction functions in ideal secret sharing schemes. We show that these functions must be sensitive to every change in any of their arguments. The scheme in their proof is a linear q?ideal secret sharing scheme, using our terminology. Our next lemma states the reverse direction.
Lemma 3.7: If an access structure A has a linear q?ideal secret sharing scheme, then A has an appropriate matroid which is representable over GF(q).
Proof: By Theorem 2.7 there is a matroid which is appropriate for A . Let be a linear q?ideal secret sharing scheme for the access structure A . Using , we will construct a dependence preserving mapping from the set of points of the matroid, f0;:::;ng, into a vector space over GF(q).
The mapping will be constructed in two stages. In the rst stage we will map V = f0;:::;ng to GF(q) q jRj , where R is the source of randomness used in . (For simplicity of notations, we assume that R is nite, but this assumption is not essential.) For every a 2 V we de ne 1 (a) = ( a (0; r 1 ); a (0; r 2 ); : : : ; a (q ? 1; r jRj ) ) intuitively 1 (a) describes the shares of party a with respect to all secrets and all random inputs. This condition is equivalent to P j2B j 1 (j) =~ , where i = ?1. Therefore, the mapping 1 satis es: The set B f0;:::;ng is dependent with respect to the matroid T if and only if there exist constants f j g j2B ; 2 GF(q) (with at least one j not equal to zero) such that P j2B j 1 (j) =~ . The mapping 1 almost satis es the requirements of a dependence preserving This de nition is related to the requirement for non-reconstructing sets in secret sharing schemes (de nition 2.2). The reader can verify that if B 6 2 A (B f1;:::;ng), then in every secret sharing scheme realizing A , party 0 (the dealer) is independent of the set B. The di erence between this de nition and de nition 2.2 is that here we treat the secret as the share of party 0, therefore we have to de ne a distribution on the secrets as well. Notice that the notions of dependent and independent set with respect to a given secret sharing schemes are not complementary. There could be a subset B of parties which can neither reconstruct the share of any of its members (and thus B in not dependent), yet can reveal some information on the share of one of its members (and thus B is not independent). However, for ideal secret sharing scheme, the following theorem of Brickell and Davenport 6] establishes the desired relation between the two notions.
Theorem 3.5: 6] Let be an ideal secret sharing scheme realizing a non-degenerate access structure A with n parties f1;:::;ng over some domain of secrets S. Let B f0;:::;ng . Then 1. Every party i either depends on the subset B with respect to , or is independent of B. 2. The subset B is independent with respect to if and only if B is an independent set in T , the appropriate matroid for A .
Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
De nition 3.6: Let q be a prime power, and a q?ideal secret sharing scheme. We say that is linear if for every set that is dependent with respect to , the reconstruction function is linear. That is, for every B f0;:::;ng and every 0 i n such that i 6 2 B and i depends on B with respect to , there are constants f j g j2B , such that for every secret s 2 GF(q) and choice of random inputs r 2 R i (s; r) = + X j2B j j (s; r)
where the constants and the arithmetic is in GF(q).
For example, we describe the t out of n threshold secret sharing scheme of Shamir 15], and show that it is linear. Let q be the size of the domain of secrets, where q is a prime-power that is bigger than n (the number of parties in the access structure). Let s 2 GF(q) be the secret. The Theorem 2.8: 6](su cient condition) 1 Let q be a prime power, and A be a non-degenerate access structure. Suppose that there is a connected matroid T that is appropriate for A . If T is representable over the eld GF(q), then A is q?ideal.
The two theorems of Brickell and Davenport almost characterize q?ideal access structures for q which is a prime power. However, there is still a remaining gap. If there is a connected matroid T that is appropriate for A but is not representable over the eld GF(q), then the theorems do not determine whether or not A is q?ideal. Recently, Seymour 14] has proved that there exists an access structure which has an appropriate matroid, but is not m?ideal for any integer m. Therefore the necessary condition of 6] is not su cient (even in a weak sense).
The Characterization Theorem
In this section we give a complete characterization for universally ideal access structure, and prove it. We recall that an access structure A is universally ideal if it is m?ideal for every integer m 2. Our main result is: Theorem 3.1: An access structure A is universally ideal if and only if A is binary-ideal (2-ideal) and ternary-ideal (3-ideal).
The proof of the theorem proceeds along the following lines: We strengthen Theorem 2.7 of Brickell and Davenport for ideal schemes over the binary and ternary domains of secrets. We show that over these domains, every reconstruction function (of the secrets from the shares) can be expressed as a linear combination of the shares of the parties. This enables us to show that if an access structure A is binary ideal, then there is a matroid T that is appropriate for A and is representable over the binary eld. The same result is proved for the ternary eld. Then, using a known result from matroid theory, we conclude that if an access structure A is binary and ternary ideal, then there is a matroid T appropriate for A which is representable over every eld. Thus, by Theorem 2.8 of Brickell and Davenport, the access structure is q?ideal for every prime power q. Using the Chinese remainder Theorem, A is m?ideal over any nite domain, namely is universally ideal, as desired.
Dependent and Independent Sets with Respect to Secret Sharing Schemes
De nition 3.2: Let be a secret sharing scheme for n parties f1;:::;ng, and the dealer which we denote by 0. The secret will be considered as the share of party 0 { the dealer { and will denoted by 0 (s; r). Let In this case we say that i is independent of B with respect to . 1 The Theorem in 6] had a slightly weaker condition, which we omit for simplicity. 
Relation between Secret Sharing Schemes and Matroids
The next de nition relates access structures and matroids.
De nition 2.6: Let A be an access structure with n parties f1;:::;ng and let T = (V; I) be a connected matroid. We say that the matroid T is appropriate for the access structure A if V = f0;:::;ng and A = cl(fC n f0g : 0 2 C and C is a minimal dependent set of T g) That is, the minimal sets of the access structure A correspond to the minimal dependent sets in the matroid which contain 0. Informally, the point 0 is added to the set f1;:::;ng to \play the role" of the dealer.
There are various properties which the collection of minimal dependent sets in a matroid must satisfy, and these properties do not necessarily hold for an arbitrary access structure. Therefore not every access structure has an appropriate matroid. But if a connected matroid is appropriate for an access structure, then it is the only matroid with this property ( A of non-empty subsets of f1;:::;ng. The sets in A are called the reconstructing sets. De nition 2.2: Let S = f0;:::;m ? 1g be a nite set of secrets, let A 2 f1;:::;ng be an access structure, and let R be a set of random input. Let f s g s2S be a set of of probability distributions on the random inputs R (that is, for every s 2 S, s : R ! 0; 1] is a probability distribution). A secret-sharing scheme with domain of secrets S is a mapping : S R ! S 1 S 2 : : : S n from the cross product of the secrets and the random inputs to a set of n-tuples (the shares). We denote the share of party i by i (s; r). A secret-sharing scheme realizes an access structure A if following two requirements hold: 
Matroids
In this subsection we recall the de nition of matroids for the sake of completeness. Matroids are well studied combinatorial objects (see for example Welsh 18] ). A matroid is an axiomatic abstraction of linear independence. We give here one of the equivalent axiom systems that de ne matroids. A matroid T = (V; I) is a nite set V and a collection I of subsets of V such that (I1) through (I3) are satis ed. (I1) ; 2 I.
de ned by Ito, Saito and Nishizeki in 8]. Given any monotone access structure, they show how to build a secret sharing scheme that realizes the access structure. Benaloh and Leichter 1] describe a more e cient way to realize general secret sharing schemes. Even with the more e cient scheme of 1], most general access structures require shares of exponential size: Even if the domain of the secret is binary, the shares are strings of length 2 (n) , where n is the number of participants. The question of lower bounds on the size of shares for some (explicit or random) access structures is still open. On the other hand, certain access structures give rise to very economical secret sharing schemes. A secret sharing scheme is called ideal if the shares are taken from the same domain as the secrets. An access structure is called m?ideal if there is an ideal secret sharing scheme which realizes the access structure over a domain of secrets of size m. Brickell 5] was the rst to introduce the notion of ideal access structures. Brickell and Davenport 6] have shown that such structures are closely related to matroids over a set containing the participants plus the dealer. They give a necessary condition for an access structure to be m?ideal (being a matroid) and a somewhat stronger su cient condition (the matroid should be representable over a eld or algebra of size m). Certain access structures, such as the threshold ones, are m?ideal for m that is at least n. However, for domains of secrets which contain m elements where m is smaller then n, the threshold access structures are not m?ideal (for threshold t such that 2 t n ? 1), as proved by Karnin, Greene and Hellman 10]. This qualitative result was improved by Kilian and Nisan 11], who showed that the t out of n threshold secret sharing scheme over a binary domain of secrets requires shares from a domain that is at least of size n ? t + 2 (for 2 t n ? 1).
We say that an access structure is universally ideal if for every positive integer m 2, the access structure is m?ideal. Universally ideal access structures are particularly convenient to work with because they are very e cient no matter what the domain of secrets is. A simple example of a universally ideal access structure is the n out of n threshold access structure. In this work we give a complete characterization of universally ideal access structures. Our work builds upon results of Brickell and Davenport which relate ideal access structures to matroids, as well as some known results from matroid theory. An obvious necessary condition for an access structure to be universally ideal is to be both 2?ideal and 3?ideal. Interestingly, our main result states that this condition is also su cient. We give examples which demonstrate that just one of these two requirements is not a su cient condition to be universally ideal.
The remaining of this paper is organized as following. In section 2 we give formal de nitions and quote the results of Brickell and Davenport. Section 3 states our main theorem, and details its proof. Section 4 illustrates some clarifying examples.
De nitions and Related Results
This section contains formal de nitions of secret sharing schemes, some background on matroids, and known related results, that will be used in the rest of this paper. Abstract Given a set of parties f1; : : : ; ng, an access structure is a monotone collection of subsets of the parties. For a certain domain of secrets, a secret sharing scheme for an access structure is a method for a dealer to distribute shares to the parties. These shares enable subsets in the access structure to reconstruct the secret, while subsets not in the access structure get no information about the secret. A secret sharing scheme is ideal if the domains of the shares are the same as the domain of the secrets. An access structure is universally ideal if there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme for it over every nite domain of secrets. An obvious necessary condition for an access structure to be universally ideal is to be ideal over the binary and ternary domains of secrets. In this work, we prove that this condition is also su cient. We also show that being ideal over just one of the two domains does not su ce for universally ideal access structures. Finally, we give an exact characterization for each of these two conditions. Index terms: Secret Sharing, Ideal access structures, Matroids, Cryptography 1 Introduction A secret sharing scheme involves a dealer who has a secret taken from a nite domain, a nite set of n parties, and a collection A of subsets of the parties called the access structure. A secret-sharing scheme for A is a method by which the dealer distributes shares to the parties such that any subset in A can reconstruct the secret from its shares, and any subset not in A cannot reveal any partial information about the secret in the information theoretic sense (such schemes are sometimes referred to as perfect). A secret sharing scheme can only exist for monotone access structures, i.e. if a subset A can reconstruct the secret, then every superset of A can also reconstruct the secret. If the subsets that can reconstruct the secret are all the sets whose cardinality is at least a certain threshold t, then the scheme is called t out of n threshold secret sharing scheme. Secret sharing schemes were rst introduced for the threshold case by Blakley 3] 
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